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Abstract
This paper studies a liberalized postal market where entrants may offer end-to-end
products or concentrate on one of the segments of the network. Absent effective bypass,
entry does not appear to be a serious financial threat to the incumbent, even when the
products are perfect substitutes. This is no longer true when the entrant offers cheaper
service in delivery. Then, the universal service provider may loose the entire pre-sorted
mail market. It is left with probably low volume demand from households and from
firms with high preparation cost, and its financial viability may be jeopardized.
JEL classification: L51; L87; L32
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1 Introduction
In most network industries, the ongoing liberalization process has spurred an intense
debate on the phenomenon of “downstream access”. Accordingly this subject has been
extensively studied in the economics literature.1 In the postal sector the issue of “access”
has been relevant long before the debate on liberalization was launched. However, it
has appeared under a different form, namely worksharing. Processing workshared mail
at a discounted rate is effectively like providing the client with access to one or several
segments of the postal network. As in the case of downstream access, we have a situation
where the postal operator sells some products which use only part of its network, while
other products use the entire network. Put differently, the postal sector has the specific
feature that access is a relevant issue even when there are no competing operators in
the market. This is reflected in the existing literature on worksharing which typically
considers a monopolistic sector; see Billette de Villemeur et al. (2002, 2003a).2
The structure of prices derived in this literature has to be reconsidered when the mar-
ket opens. Competition may take two different forms. First, once entry has occurred,
the demand for workshared mail may in part emanate from the competing operators.
Specifically, the entrant may have all or part of its mail delivered by the incumbent (for
an access charge) rather then build its own delivery network. In that case competition is
limited to the upstream segments (mail preparation, etc.). Consequently, “high” access
charges (ECPR type corrected by Ramsey elements) are likely to be optimal. They
ensure that the entrant’s products contribute in an adequate way to the incumbent’s
fixed cost (and the financing of the universal service obligation). Second, the entrant
may find it optimal to “bypass” the incumbent’s network in some areas by setting up
its own delivery network. Now competition affects all segments and the ability of the
incumbent to cover its fixed costs may be undermined. The possibility of bypass limits
the potential for the entrant’s products to contribute towards universal service costs and
pricing rules will have to be amended. The incumbent’s pricing policy will be modified
accordingly with the expection of a rather significant impact.
1See Laffont and Tirole (1996, 2000) and Armstrong (2002).
2See also Crew and Kleindorfer (1995), Mitchel (1999), Sherman (2001) and Panzar (2002).
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In this paper, we put together a number of building blocks that we have developed
over the last years. Specifically, we build on Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003a, 2004 and
2005) which we generalize by introducing different types of delivery areas and the possi-
bility of bypass. Probably the most useful contribution of this is the specification of the
“demand model”3 which allows business mailers to choose to purchase end-to-end service
and/or workshared service from either the incumbent or the entrant. Furthermore, the
products of the incumbent and entrant are differentiated. However, the workshared and
end-to-end services of both providers are perfect substitutes in terms of their value to
final consumers. The closest predecessor to our analysis is Panzar (2005).4 He also used
a setting based on Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003a) to study the interaction between
liberalization and unbundling and to introduce the notion of “piecemeal bypass”. While
our model is more complex than Panzar’s, the two papers are fairly complementary in
that they envision different types of entry.5 The crucial ingredient in Panzar’s model is
end-to-end competition (possibly through piecemeal bypass) on single-piece mail. We
do not consider competition in the single-piece market segment. Instead, we concentrate
on the industrial mail market that appears to be the main theater for competition at
least within the European context.
We provide optimal pricing rules for the specification with general demand (but
without uniform pricing constraint). Even though we are able to provide some analyti-
cal results, it is clear that a fully fledged study of the general model requires numerical
simulations. That part of the paper is thus to be understood as an essentially method-
ological contribution, setting up a framework to be used in future numerical studies. In
the second part of the paper we look at a more restrictive setting and provide crisper
results that are not only interesting for their own sake but have important policy im-
plications. The main finding from that perspective is that the possibility of bypass
may have a rather drastic impact on the results. It brings about not just a quantita-
tive change in the level of prices but a qualitative shift in the very nature of potential
3We thank the referee for suggesting this terminology.
4The current version of Panzar’s paper was presented also presented at the 13th CRRI Conference
on Postal and Delivery Economics. However, his analysis is anterior to ours. An earlier version of his
paper (presented at IDEI in November 2003) already contained the crucial features.
5We also provide more elaborated expressions for the pricing rules.
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equilibria. Specifically we show that under bypass the universal service operator may
not be able to retain the most lucrative market segment which in turn would seriously
undermine its financial viability.
2 Model
2.1 Cost and demand
There are two operators: the incumbent universal service operator I and an entrant E.
The stylized postal network we consider consists of two segments. Segment 1 corresponds
to a composite activity including collecting, sorting and transportation. This activity
implies a constant marginal cost of c1 for operator I and of kE for operator E. Segment
2 is delivery. Operator I’s marginal delivery cost is cu2 and c
r
2 in areas u(rban) and
r(ural) respectively. Operator E delivers in areas u only, at a marginal cost of cE2 . In
addition, there is a fixed cost associated with the delivery network which differs across
areas and operators. The fixed cost of the incumbent in the two areas is given by Fu
and F r respectively (with Fu < F r). If the entrant decides to build a delivery network
in the urban area he incurs a fixed cost of Φu. The corresponding level for the rural area
Φr is assumed to be prohibitive (so that the entrant will never find it optimal to deliver
in the rural area).6 The remaining fixed costs (i.e., those not associated with delivery)
are F for operator I and Φ for operator E. There are N addressees of which a fraction
α is located in area u, while the remaining fraction (1− α) is located in area r.
There are two types of senders and two goods. Senders of type h (households)
consume good x which is supplied by I and uses both segments. The marginal cost of x
is thus given by c1 + ci2, i = u, r. Customers of type f can patronize the two operators,
I and E; furthermore they may or may not use segment 1 of the respective operator.
When they use the operator’s segment, they buy the end-to-end (E2E) product, which
is denoted by x for operator I (the product which is also consumed by households) and
y for operator E. If they do not use segment 1 (thus engaging in worksharing) they
consume good zI (incumbent) or zE (entrant). In that case they bear a preparation
cost k which is distributed over
£
k, k¯
¤
according to the cumulative distribution G(k)
6To be more precise, the level of fixed cost per addressee in the rural area is supposed to be prohibitive.
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I E
E2E Workshared E2E Workshared
Notation x zI y zE
Marginal cost operator c1 + c2 c2 (kE + a) or a or
(kE + cE2 ) c
E
2
Marginal cost customers px pz + k qy qz + k
Table 1: Customers of type f : products and costs
with density g(k). Observe that k arises in addition to the price paid to the operators
for zI or zE. Except for the cost difference x and zI on the one hand and y and zE on
the other hand are considered as perfect substitutes.
Prices are given by px, puz and prz for operator I and by quy , qry, quz and qrz for operator
E. Observe that I’s single piece mail has a uniform price. All other types of mail may
be priced non uniformly (at least in some scenarios).
The Table 1 summarizes the main features of our model. It lists the different prod-
ucts available to type f customers and for each provides the marginal costs for the
operators and the marginal cost for the consumer.7 It also incorporates some other no-
tations, namely kE and cE2 already mentioned (marginal cost of segment 1 and segment
2 for operator E), as well as a (access charge). Note that the cost for the operator E
depends on whether there is access or bypass (see Subsection 2.2 for more details).
Let Sih(x
i
h) denote the (gross) surplus of household senders per addressee in area
i = u, r, while Sif (x
i
f + z
i
I , y
i+ ziE, k) represents the (gross) surplus of the sender of type
f with characteristic k, per addressee in area i = u, r. 8 Observe that k represents not
only the preparation cost, but also determines surplus hence demand.9 Net surplus is
obtained by subtracting total cost: payment to the operator plus cost of activity 1, if
7Superscripts u and r are dropped for simplicity.
8For simplicity we use surplus as a welfare measure for firms. From a strict welfare economics point of
view, this can be understood as representing the surplus of the consumers who buy the goods produced
by firms f which use postal services as inputs. One can easily show that our shortcut does not involve
any loss of generality in the case where all downstream markets are competitive.
9Alternatively one could identify types by, say, θ and write preparation costs as k(θ). However, this
would just introduce redundant notation.
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applicable. The demand function for households is given by:
xih (p) = argmaxx
©
Sih (x)− px
ª
. (1)
Similarly, the demand functions of the representative sender f are obtained by maxi-
mizing net surplus
Sif (x
i
f + z
i
I , y
i + ziE, k)− pxxif − (piz + k)ziI − qiyyi − (qiz + k)ziE
s.t xif , z
i
I , y
i
f , z
i
E > 0.
This yields four possible cases, labeled (1), (2a), (2b) and (3) with demand functions
(for i = u, r):
(1) xif (px, q
i
y, k) and yi(px, qiy, k) if piz + k > px and qiz + k > qiy,
(2a) ziI(p
i
z + k, qiy, k) and yi(piz + k, qiy, k) if piz + k ≤ px and qiz + k > qiy,
(2b) xif (px, q
i
z + k, k) and ziE(px, q
i
z + k, k) if piz + k > px and qiz + k ≤ qiy,
(3) ziI(p
i
z + k, qiz + k, k) and ziE(p
i
z + k, qiz + k, k) if piz + k ≤ px and qiz + k ≤ qiy.
(2)
To understand this expression note first that when piz + k = px we have xif (px, q, k) =
ziI(p
i
z + k, q, k) (workshared mail and end to end mail of a given operator are perfect
substitutes). Furthermore, all users of type f for which piz + k ≤ px (i.e., when
k ≤ px − piz) find it profitable to buy good ziI at a level ziI(piz + k, q, k). Observe that
overall per-unit cost of zi is equal to piz+k; it is this overall cost rather than just piz which
determines demand. On the other hand, when piz + k > px, it is cheaper to consume x
(which is otherwise a perfect substitute) and demand is xif (px, p
i
y, k). Similarly, we have
yi(p, qiy, k) = ziE(p, q
i
z + k, k) when qiz + k = qiy.
An alternative way to look at this is to define (i = u, r)
eki = px − piz, and bki = qy − qiz.
Clearly the relevant cases depend on the comparison between eki and bki. This is illus-
trated in Figure 1. In Case 1 the customer’s level of k is so high that he buys only
end-to-end products, from either operator. Case 3 refers to low levels of k where firms
engage in worksharing with both operators. Case 2a and 2b are the intermediate cases.
In case 2a the firm buys end-to-end from E while worksharing its mail with I. In case
5
ˆk k>
ˆk k<
k kˆ k k
case 3 case 2a case 1
k kˆk k
case 3 case 2b case 1
Figure 1: Configuration of type f customers’ demand functions.
2b the firm buys end-to-end form I while worksharing its mail with E. When eki = bki,
only case 1 and 3 are relevant but since prices are endogenous, we cannot impose this
restriction on an a priori basis.
Substituting demand functions (1) and (2) into net surplus yields the indirect utility
functions V ih(px) and V
i
f
¡
piz, px, qiz, qiy, k
¢
(for f , these are per addressee in area i = u, r
).10 Total utility of type f consumer k is then given by:
αNV uf
¡
puz , px, q
u
z , q
u
y , k
¢
+ (1− α)NV rf
¡
prz, px, q
r
z , q
r
y, k
¢
.
10For h we have V ih (px) = S
i
h

xih (px)

− pxxih (px) . For f , net surplus is given by
Sif (x
i
f + z
i
I , y
i + ziE , k)− pxxif − (piz + k)ziI − qiyyi − (qiz + k)ziE .
The full expression for V if

piz, px, qiz, qiy, k

is complicated because it has to account for the four demand
cases. It is omitted for simplicity.
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2.2 Access, bypass and profit levels
Operator E pays an access charge of ar per unit of (rural) mail which is to be deliv-
ered by I. Operator I is assumed not to be allowed to discriminate in the pricing of
the downstream services it provides entrants and its own customers, giving rise to the
requirement that ar = prz. Consequently prz is not just the price for workshared mail, it
is also the access price charged to E to deliver its mail in the rural area.
To write the cost and profit functions of the operators we have to distinguish between
two regimes: access (subscript ac) and bypass (subscript bp) in the urban area (recall
that there is no bypass in the rural area). Furthermore, we use uppercase letters for
(total) market demand levels.
Access
The cost of operator I is given by
CIac = (c1 + c
u
2)X
u+(c1 + cr2)X
r+cu2(Z
u
I +Y
u+ZuE)+c
r
2 (Z
r
I + Y
r + ZrE)+F+F
u+F r,
(3)
while for operator E we have
CEac = kEY
u + au(Y u + ZuE) + kEY
r + ar(Y r + ZrE) + Φ. (4)
For the profits, we have respectively:
πIac = px (X
u +Xr) + puzZ
u
I + a
u(Y u + ZuE) + p
r
zZ
r
I + a
r(Y r + ZrE)− CIac, (5)
πEac = q
u
yY
u + qryY
r + quzZ
u
E + q
r
zZ
r
E − CEac. (6)
Bypass
Under (urban) bypass the following expressions apply :
CIbp = (c1 + c
u
2)X
u + (c1 + cr2)X
r + cu2Z
u
I + c
r
2 (Z
r
I + Y
r + ZrE) + F + F
u + F r,(7)
CEbp = kEY
u + cE2 (Y
u + ZuE) + kEY
r + ar(Y r + ZrE) + Φ+Φ
u, (8)
πIbp = px (X
u +Xr) + puzZ
u
I + p
r
zZ
r
I + a
r(Y r + ZrE)− CIbp, (9)
πEbp = q
u
yY
u + qryY
r + quzZ
u
E + q
r
zZ
r
E − CEbp. (10)
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Equations (3)—(6) on the one hand and (7)—(10) on the other hand have of course a
very similar structure. The only differences are due to the way ZuE and Y
u are processed.
Under access ZuE and Y
u appear in the incumbent’s profits both on the cost and on the
revenue side. Their marginal cost to the entrant is given by au (see also Table 1). Under
bypass, neither ZuE nor Y
u do at all appear in the incumbents profits. Their marginal
cost to the entrant is cu2 and the entrant incurs an extra fixed cost Φ
u.
2.3 Pricing of the entrant
We assume that the entrant realizes exogenously given markups: βuz , β
r
z, β
u
y and β
r
y that
may differ according to the area and/or the product. Observe that the case where all
or some of the markups are equal is not ruled out.
In regime ac, prices of E are thus given by:
quy = (a
u + kE)(1 + βuy), (11)
qry = (a
r + kE)(1 + βry), (12)
quz = a
u(1 + βuz ), (13)
qrz = a
r(1 + βrz). (14)
We assume that in this regime we have ZuE = Z
r
E = 0. This assumption appears to be
particularly compelling when piz = ai.
In regime bp, prices of E in area u are given by:
quy = (c
E
2 + k
E)(1 + βuy), (15)
quz = c
E
2 (1 + β
u
z ). (16)
Prices in area r are the same as in regime ac and continue to be given by (12) and (14).
Following the approach adopted in regime ac, we also assume ZrE = 0 under regime bp.
In essence this amounts to assuming that the entrant’s workshared product is offered
only in u and only under bypass.
The constant markup assumption is made for simplicity. It is the simplest framework
compatible with the existence of fixed costs for the entrant. Alternatively one could
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assume that the entrant’s prices are given by Bertrand type reaction functions; see
Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003b).11 For instance, we would have
qry = q
r
y(a
r, px) (17)
i.e., the entrant’s price (best reply) is a function of the access charge (which determines
its cost) but also of the incumbents price. This shows that our specification involves two
different restrictions. First, that ∂qry/∂ar is constant and, second, that we neglect the
strategic interaction through which the incumbents price affects the entrant’s pricing
policy. One can easily check that the first restriction has no impact on the results we
provide; in particular, the optimal pricing rules remain valid.12 Accounting for the effect
of px on the other hand would complicate the expressions (there would be extra terms
which we implicitly assume to be of second order).
An alternative way to rationalize the constant markup assumption is to assume
that the entrant’s demand functions have constant price elasticity. In that case (and
given that marginal cost is constant) the Bertrand reaction function of the entrant (17)
reduces to a simple constant markup rule.13
To simplify the subsequent expressions it is convenient to define market demand func-
tions Xi
¡
px, piz, qiy, qiz
¢
and ZiI
¡
px, piz, qiy, qiz
¢
for the incumbent and Y i
¡
px, piz, qiy, qiz
¢
and ZiE
¡
px, piz, qiy, qiz
¢
for the entrant (i = u, r).14
2.4 Bypass and entry decisions
The entrant will bypass if
βuy(a
u + kE)Y u[px, puz , (a
u + kE)(1 + βuy), a
u(1 + βuz )] <
βuy(c
E
2 + k
E)Y u[px, puz , (c
E
2 + k
E)(1 + βuy), c
E
2 (1 + β
u
z )]
+ βuz c
E
2 Z
u
E[px, p
u
z , (c
E
2 + k
E)(1 + βuy), c
E
2 (1 + β
u
z )]− Φu.
11 In other words, we have a leader follower setting.
12Some redefinitions of elasticities are required, though.
13This is a commonly used shortcut in monopolistic competition model; see Tirole (1988), ch. 7.
Observe that Crew and Kleindorfer (2006) also work with a specification that involves a constant
markup. However, they adjust the markup so that fixed costs are just covered. We simply assume that
markups are exogenous but argue that this may be consistent with profit maximization.
14The formal definitions are straightforward but somewhat tedious. They are contained in a technical
appendix available on the authors’ website at www.idei.fr.
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The LHS of this expression is the profit of operator E in area u if he uses the incumbent’s
network to deliver the mail.15 Recall that the operator applies a constant markup. To
determine the profit we can thus multiply unit costs by the markup and multiply by
the quantity. The RHS is the profit when he uses his own network (and thus incurs the
extra fixed cost Φu).
Assuming that the LHS of this expression is decreasing in au, there exists a critical
value of the access charge, eau such that the operator bypasses whenever au > eau and
uses I’s delivery network otherwise. This critical level is of course increasing in Φu.
Note that when the constraint au = puz is imposed this becomes more complicated.
3 Results with general demand
The model we have introduced is rather complicated. In particular, uniform pricing of
x and (possibly) z, will lead to complicated expressions. To keep the model as simple as
possible we shall concentrate on two special (and extreme) cases. We shall successively
assume α = 0 (all addressees are in area r) and then α = 1 (all addressees are in area u).
The first setting α = 0 yields the no bypass case; the entrant’s products are delivered
by the incumbent. This is similar to Billette de Villemeur et al. (2005), except that the
entrant’s pricing strategy is different (constant markup rather than competitive fringe).
We assume pz = a so that worksharing customers and competitors pay the same price
for delivery. The second setting, α = 1 is the “full bypass” case where all the entrant’s
products are delivered through its own network. The access price only applies to the
worksharing customers.
In either case we make other, more specific assumptions which will be discussed
below. The main advantage of looking at these extreme cases is that we do not have
to worry about uniform pricing. Furthermore, since we have a pure access and a pure
bypass regime, we can try to compare the pricing rules to assess the impact of bypass
on access prices.
Before proceeding let us point out that while the two cases we consider are admit-
tedly restrictive their analysis has more far-reaching implications. This is because the
15Making use of the assumption that ZuE = 0 under access.
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results remain valid when 0 < α < 1, as long as there is no uniform pricing. To be more
precise, the expressions for area r are then simply those we obtain for α = 0, while those
for u correspond to the solution with α = 1. With uniform pricing, on the other hand,
expressions would be significantly more complex. As the FOCs would then be convex
combinations of the conditions we obtain, an analytical study of the pricing rules would
no longer appear to be possible.16
3.1 The case α = 0
By setting α = 0, we assume that all mail is to be delivered in the rural area where, by as-
sumption, there is no bypass. Furthermore, we impose ar = prz and assume ZrE = 0: un-
der access the entrant does not offer z. This is necessarily true when for the workshared
mail, I and E’s products are sufficiently close substitutes to obtain ZrE (q
r
z , prz) = 0 if
qrz > ar = prz. In this case we return to the setting of Billette de Villemeur et al. (2005)
and the pricing rules can be obtained from the expression provided there by redefining
qry (prz) according to (12).17 This yields
px − (c1 + cr2)
px
=
λ
1 + λ
1bσrX (18)
prz − cr2
pz
=
λ
1 + λ
1bσrY+ZI (19)
where bσrX and bσrY+ZI are the superelasticities of eXr (prx, prz) = Xr £prx, prz, qry (prz)¤ andeY r (prx, prz) + eZrI (prx, prz) = Y r £prx, prz, qry (prz)¤+ ZrI £prx, prz, qry (prz)¤ respectively.18
Consequently, the access/workshared price pz = a is determined by the usual inverse
superelasticity rule. Since the price pertains to two products Y and ZI (which have the
same cost for I, but different demands) the superelasticity is that of the sum of these
demands and we can think about Y +ZI = eY r (prx, prz)+ eZrI (prx, prz) as aggregate demand
for “access” (or rather access cum worksharing).
16Even with linear demand functions, one would have to resort to numerical simulations.
17Billette de Villemeur et al. (2005) consider a competitive fringe which amount to setting all the
β’s to zero. The current setting is thus a generalization of Billette de Villemeur et al. (2005) but
the expression are derived exactly along the same lines (and interestingly change very little essentially
because the markup is a multiplicative factor which cancels out in the various elasticities.)
18Recall that the definition of hXr (prx, prz) accounts for the induced price variations of the entrant; see
Billette de Villemeur et al. (2005), p. 149.
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3.2 The case α = 1
Assume now that all mail is to be delivered in the urban area where the entrant has his
own delivery network. Access is now only provided to worksharing customers. For the
time being, we do not analyze the bypass decision of the entrant; we simply assume that
bypass occurs at the equilibrium. Put differently, all the expressions here are derived
conditional on there being bypass. Doing this, we neglect two aspects. First, the optimal
pz in the access regime (determined according to (19) for a marginal cost of cu2) may be
such that bypass is not interesting anyway (for instance, because Φu is large). Second,
even when this is not true, the incumbent might find it desirable to lower its price to
discourage bypass. We shall revisit this issue below.
The entrant’s prices are determined by (15) and (16). Consequently, they are given
and do not depend on the incumbent’s prices. This implies that the structure of operator
I’s pricing problem is exactly the same as in the monopoly case studied by Billette de
Villemeur et al. (2003a). There are terms in the objective function which were not
present in the monopoly case (e.g. the profit of E) but these are constant when it
comes to determining I’s price structure. The level and elasticity of demand for X
and Z will of course differ from the monopoly case, but like in that situation these are
effectively only functions of px and pz (the other arguments being constant).
It thus follows that the optimal pricing rules are given by expression (15) and (16)
of Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003a) so that we have (with the notation of the current
paper)
px − (c1 + cu2)
px
=
λ
1 + λ
1
σuX
=
λ
1 + λ
1bσuX , (20)
puz − cu2
puz
=
λ
1 + λ
1
σuZI
=
λ
1 + λ
1bσuZI (21)
where σuX and σ
u
ZI are the superelasticities of X and ZI respectively. Observe that we
do not have to distinguish between X and ZI on the one hand and eX and eZI on the
other hand because the indirect effect through the price of the other operator does not
occur here. Consequently, we have σuX = bσuX and σuZI = bσuZI so that bσ’s are not needed
here; they are only used for reasons of symmetry with expression (18) and (19).
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Let us now consider the implications of (18)—(21) for pz under access and bypass.
We set cu2 = c
r
2 = c2 (which makes sense here) and then have to compare bσuZI andbσrY+ZI or dropping the index (because in each case we are considering the entire set of
addressees) bσZI and bσY+ZI . On purely theoretical grounds this comparison does not
appear to be unambiguous; to be more precise it is an empirical issue. The following
elements appear to be relevant. First, in bσZI , we have a single product whereas bσY+ZI
includes two products. It is not clear how this affects the comparison. Second, and more
significantly, the content of ZI is not the same in the two expressions. Under bypass, ZI
has a direct competitor and thus substitute (namely ZE). Under access, on the other
hand, there is no alternative to ZI ; even when the customer patronizes E, the mail
will eventually be delivered by I. For this reason, we can expect the elasticity of Z to
be significantly higher under bypass. Third, the value of λ is likely to differ between
the two cases and possibly in ways that offset the impact of the higher elasticities of Z
under bypass.
Summing up, it appears possible to make a case for pz to be lower under bypass
(even when “strategic”, bypass preventing behavior is not accounted for). Introducing
such strategic behavior can of course only reinforce this conclusion.
4 Access vs. bypass with perfect substitutes
Let us now assume that the entrant’s and the incumbent’s products are perfect sub-
stitutes. More precisely we assume that x and y are perfect substitutes, so that the
same property applies to zE and zI . Once again, we successively study the cases α = 0
(access) and α = 1 (full bypass). The first case has essentially already been studied in
Billette de Villemeur et al. (2004), except that we have a markup for the entrant rather
than the competitive fringe.
4.1 The case α = 0 (no bypass)
In this case we have either qry > px (Regime I) or qry ≤ px (Regime II). Recall that
product zE is not provided.
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4.1.1 Regime I : qry > px
In this case, the entrant’s market share is zero and we return to the monopoly setting
of Billette de Villemeur et al. (2003a). The case is excluded by assumption (the entrant
has no revenue and cannot cover its fixed cost; anticipating this, he would not enter in
the first place).
4.1.2 Regime II : qry ≤ px
To assess if this regime occurs, we have to compare qry (prz) ≥ kE + prz to px = ekr + prz.
A necessary condition for qry ≤ px is that kE < ekr = px − prz. In this regime, we have
Xr (px, prz) = Xrh (px): the good X is consumed only by households. The mail of the
different firms is split between the entrant E (for the high k) and the incumbent I (for
the low k) as shown on Figure 2 and we have
Zr (prz) =
Z qry−prz
k
zrk(p
r
z + k)g (k) dk,
Y r
¡
qry
¢
=
Z k
qry−prz
yrk(q
r
y)g (k) dk.
Note that, since y and x (hence z) are perfect substitutes, yk (p) = zk (p) . As a result,
this is “as if” the entry of firm E were allowing firms with k ≥ qry−prz ≥ kE to sort their
mail at a cost of only kE. Firm I is now facing a set of firms with a distribution of k
which is cut from above at the level qry− prz and all these firms consume the workshared
mail. Note however that this allocation is not necessarily efficient since if the entrant
makes a positive markup, it follows that qry > kE + ar hence even if ar = prz some
firms with k > kE will nevertheless find it profitable to workshare their mail (instead
of letting the entrant prepare it).
4.2 The case α = 1
We now turn to the case with full bypass. If the incumbent’s products are perfect
substitutes, then the demand for a product is positive only if the corresponding operator
offers the lowest price. It follows that a firm with a sorting cost k consumes xuf when
14
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Figure 2: Partition of type f customers in Regime II under access. Customers with
k < qy − pz consume workshared mail (provided by the incumbent). Customers with
larger levels of k buy the entrant’s end-to-end product Y.
the following conditions hold
px ≤ quy = (cE2 + kE)(1 + βuy),
px ≤ puz + k,
px ≤ quz + k = cE2 (1 + βuz ) + k.
Similarly, it consumes zuf when the following conditions are satisfied
puz + k ≤ quz + k = cE2 (1 + βuz ) + k,
puz + k ≤ px,
puz + k ≤ quy = (cE2 + kE)(1 + βuy),
For given levels of quy , quz we then obtain 4 regimes, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Regime I: the entrant is more expensive for all products px < quy and puz < quz .
In this case, the entrant does not enter. This solution is equivalent to Regime I in the
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Figure 3: Regimes in the bypass case.
no bypass case. Once again, it is excluded by assumption (the entrant has no revenue
and cannot cover its fixed cost; anticipating this, he would not enter in the first place).
Regime II : the entrant is cheaper for end-to-end mail only: px > quy but
puz < quz . In this case, the demand for commodity X reduces to the one of households
Xuh (px) . Firms workshare their mail to the incumbent (consume zI) when pz + k ≤ quy ;
otherwise, they consume Y ; see Figure 4. Observe that this regime is similar to Regime
II in the no bypass case discussed in subsection 4.1.2. The difference is that the entrant’s
end-to-end product is no longer delivered by the incumbent. This is to a large extent
an artifact of our assumption that there is effectively bypass. With puz < quz this is,
however, not likely to occur when the bypass decision is endogenous. In that case we
would thus effectively return to Regime II in the access case.
The price px is the same as in the no bypass case, Regime II:
px − (c1 + cu2)
px
=
λ
1 + λ
1
εXuh
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Figure 4: Partition of type f customers in Regime II under bypass. Customers with
k < qy − pz consume workshared mail (provided by the incumbent). Customers with
larger levels of k buy the entrant’s end-to-end product Y.
The demand for Zu writes
ZuI
¡
puz , q
u
y
¢
=
Z quy−puz
k
zuk (p
u
z + k, k)g (k) dk.
Interestingly enough, it does not depend on px. Consequently, the optimal price puz , as
defined by the standard Ramsey expression
puz − cu2
puz
=
λ
1 + λ
1
εZuI
,
is also independent from px, for a given level of λ. The aggregate elasticity εZuI can be
decomposed as follows:
εZuI =
puz
ZuI
µZ quy−puz
k
−∂zuk (puz + k, k)
∂puz
g (k) dk + zuk
¡
quy
¢
g
¡
quy − puz
¢¶
=
Z quy−puz
k
αkZuI ε
u
kdk + α
k=quy
ZuI
where αkZuI = g (k) z
u
k/Z
u
I is the share of demand by type k firms and ε
u
k the price
elasticity. Clearly when quy increases, the interval
£
k, quy − puz
¤
increases incorporating
firms with lower elasticities which suggest that the aggregate elasticity will also decrease.
As a result, the socially optimal price puz increases with quy .
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Regime III: the entrant is cheaper for workshared mail only: px < quy but
puz > quz . For this regime to occur, we have to assume that:
px < quy = (1 + β
u
y)(c
E
2 + k
E),
quz = c
E
2 (1 + β
u
z ) < p
u
z ,
which is unlikely to arise if the markup of entrants is sufficiently low and their upstream
costs are well below those of the incumbent.
Assume nevertheless that both of these inequalities hold. In this case, the demand
for the commodity ZuI is equal to zero. As a result, there is no loss on the incumbent’s
revenue if price pz is reduced to cu2 . It follows that q
u
z = cE2 (1 + β
u
z ) ≤ cu2 is a necessary
condition for Regime III to arise.
In this regime, as illustrated by Figure 5, consumers of type f with low levels of k
consume zE, while those with high k’s consume x. The only demand for the incumbent’s
products is the demand for commodity X:
Xu (px, quz ) = X
u
h (px) +
Z k
px−quz
xuf (px, k)g (k) dk.
Interestingly enough, it does not depend on pz. The price px is set according to the
Ramsey rule
px − (c1 + cu2)
px
=
λ
1 + λ
1
εXu
and is independent from puz , for a given level of λ. The aggregate price-elasticity is
εXu =
px
Xu
Ã
−∂Xuh (px)
∂px
+
Z k
px−quz
−∂xuf (px, k)
∂px
g (k) dk + xuf (px, px − quz ) g (px − quz )
!
which is likely to increase when quz decreases. (The “high elasticity consumer” shift to
the entrants product). As a result the socially optimal price px increases with quz .
Observe that, in Regime III, the incumbent’s demand emanates only from house-
holds and from firms with high preparation cost (that are likely to be also the customers
with a lower volume). Compared to the previous two regimes, the incumbent has thus
totally lost a crucial market segment (namely the firms with low preparation cost).
Budget balancing would thus “at best” require a rather large price for X. Moreover,
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Figure 5: Partition of type f customers in Regime III under bypass. Customers with
k < qz − px consume the entrant’s workshared mail product. Customers with larger
levels of k buy the incumbent’s end-to-end product X.
since the remaining market segments can be expected to yield a rather low volume, it
may well be the case that the highest possible (gross) profit that can be achieved is not
sufficient to cover the fixed cost. We shall return to this point below.
Regime IV : the entrant is cheaper for both type of products px > quy and puz >
quz . In this case the demand for the incumbent reduces to the demand of households
Xu
¡
px, puz , quy , quz
¢
= Xuh (px) . Compared to Regime III an additional segment (namely
the firms with high preparation costs) has been lost by the incumbent. With a single
category of customers left, it is now even more unlikely that the incumbent would be
able to break-even.
When break even is possible the optimal pricing rule is given by
px − (c1 + cu2)
px
=
λ
1 + λ
1
εXuh
,
where λ adjusts for the firm to be able to break-even. When the fixed cost to be covered
equals the (gross) monopoly profit the multiplier λ goes to infinity and the incumbent
does not differ from a profit-maximizing firm. For higher levels of F no solution exists
and the incumbent would not be able to survive.
When do these regimes occur? In Figure 3 and in the subsequent discussion, we
have characterized the regimes by conditions that involve endogenous variables (in par-
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Figure 6: Regimes in the bypass case in the (qy, qz) space.
ticular px and pz). This presentation is most convenient in that it allows us to easily
get an intuitive understanding of the implication of the different regimes. However, it
does not give us a full characterization of the solution and it does not tell us precisely
which exogenous parameter combination result in which regime. To address this ques-
tion, we use a representation in the (qy, qz) space (see Figure 6). Recall that under
bypass, both of these prices are exogenous and given by equations (15) and (16). In this
space, we depict the incumbent’s (welfare maximizing) prices under monopoly px(M)
and pz(M). These levels are also well defined and can be considered as exogenous for
the question under investigation here. The incumbent’s delivery cost c2 is also depicted
on the vertical axis. It is plain that when qy > px(M) and qz > pz(M) we will have
Regime I, while qy < px(M) and qz < c2 yields Regime IV . Similarly, one easily
shows that qy < px(M) along with qz > pz(M) yields Regime II while qy > px(M)
and qz < c2 results in Regime III. To see this, one has to recall the properties of the
different regimes discussed above, while keeping in mind the regimes depend on the in-
cumbent’s effective price (and not directly on the hypothetical monopoly price).19 The
intermediate (transitional) regimes I 0 and II 0 require a more careful explanation. For
19For instance, when qy > px(M) and qz > pz(M) the incumbent can just set the same prices as
under monopoly.
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instance, when qy > px(M) along with pz(M) > qz > c2, the incumbent would end up
in Regime III if he were to maintain its high monopoly price (for z). Clearly it is a
better strategy to “undercut” the entrant to retain the industrial mail segment, as long
as this yields a price which exceeds the incumbent’s delivery cost c2 (and thus a positive
markup which contributes towards the financing of fixed costs). This corresponds to
the strategic bypass deterring we have not addressed above.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the potential market equilibria in a liberalized postal market
where a regulated incumbent (the universal service provider) competes with non regu-
lated entrants. The model accounts for a number of features that are already or may
become relevant in the postal sector in most European member states. These include the
possibility of access, bypass, consolidation and worksharing. Doing this, we have consid-
ered that entrants may offer end-to-end products or concentrate on one of the segments
of the network. We have shown that a wide variety of scenarios can emerge depending
on the regulatory environment and on the relative cost and demand structures for the
incumbent and the entrants’ products.
To wrap up and to draw some lessons, let us concentrate on the case where the
products offered by incumbent and entrant are perfect substitutes (Section 4). To
stress the main contributions of this paper, we shall particularly emphasize the impact
of bypass. We have seen that when bypass is possible a number of possible scenarios
can arise.
It may be the case that liberalization induces no changes compared to the (regulated)
monopoly scenario. This is the case when the (regulated) monopoly prices make entry
by any potential operator non profitable (Regime I). When entry effectively does occur,
the new operator may offer cheaper service than the incumbent in some or in all market
segments. The most favorable case for the incumbent is when the entrant is cheaper
only for end-to-end mail (Regime II). This can occur for instance when the entrant
is able to sort mail at a lower cost than the incumbent (kE ≤ c1). In this case, the
incumbent’s end-to-end product is consumed exclusively by households. Firms (and the
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entrant operator in the no bypass case) use the incumbent’s delivery services only for
the workshared mail. Compared to Regime I, the incumbent has lost market share, but
it retains probably the most lucrative segment, namely the firms with low preparation
costs. Observe that both of these regimes can occur in the access as well as in the bypass
case. Even if it is theoretically possible, bypass will not have a significant impact under
these two regimes. Consequently, bypass is unlikely to occur in the first place. In other
words when the model is extended to account for the bypass decision (as discussed in
Subsection 2.4), it is not likely that the entrant will find it profitable to build its own
delivery network.
A very different result obtains when the entrant offers cheaper service in delivery.
This can occur for instance in relatively dense areas where the delivery costs of the en-
trant may be well below the (possibly uniform) delivery price charged by the incumbent
(cE2 < c
E
2 (1 + β
u
z ) ≤ puz ). In this case, the incumbent loses the entire pre-sorted mail
market (Regime III). It is left with demand emanating only from households and from
firms with high preparation cost (that are likely to be also the customers with lower
volumes). Since the remaining market segments can be expected to yield a rather low
volume, the universal service operator’s revenues may no longer be sufficient to cover
its fixed cost. Consequently, under Regime III the financial viability of the universal
service operator is jeopardized.
This would be even more likely in Regime IV , where the incumbent is left solely
with the demand from households. Volumes are then even smaller than in Regime III
and one cannot expect them to provide a sufficient contribution to cover the universal
provider’s fixed costs. It is not clear how universal service (and specifically service to
households) can be guaranteed in this setting. Observe that the two critical regimes
require bypass. Absent bypass, the existence of the incumbent does not appear to be
seriously threatened, as long of course as access charges are set appropriately.
Throughout the paper, we have implicitly restricted the incumbent’s pricing strate-
gies in several ways. The restrictions are meant to account for regulatory constraints
that are often imposed in practice. In particular, we have not considered price differ-
entiation (for instance between households and firms) and we have not considered the
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possibility of strategic “bypass deterrence” (setting an access price just below the com-
petitor’s delivery cost). When the incumbent’s pricing policy is restricted, the entrant
may be able to offer services at a lower price only because it is able to differentiate its
prices between customers (while the incumbent is subject to uniform or non discrimina-
tory pricing requirements). In that case, allowing the incumbent to differentiate prices as
well may improve welfare. More generally, providing the universal service provider with
more flexible pricing tools could mitigate the threat that bypass poses to its survival.
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